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  The potential for renewable energy from agriculture is greatest when the use of non-food 
potion of crops is considered.  The development of renewable energy industries involving such 
products as cereal straw, corn stover and energy crops is complex.  There are technical questions 
concerning the processing technology, seed genetics and agronomic and environmental factors; 
logistic questions concerning the storage and transportation of the feedstock and finally 
organization questions concerning the relationship between potential biomass producers and 
processors. 
While there is much research investigating technology and logistic questions, 
organization and contracting decisions remains an area less represented in the current literature.  
Also contributing to the importance of organization is the fact that row crop waste and energy 
crop supply chains are less developed than other biomass based renewable energy industries.  
The current U.S. biopower industry is based on concentrated wood and food wastes streams 
where vertical integration is used in most of the industry.  Further, the traditional starch to 
ethanol industry has well developed supply chains based on corn.  Row crop waste and energy 
crop biomass supply channels will have significant hurdles to overcome in the shift from ad hoc 
supply systems involving informal contracting and barter systems to more formal systems that 
renewable energy processors are likely to utilize. 
This paper examines the contracting aspects of the Iogen Cooperation as they attempt to 
develop a cellulose ethanol industry based on cereal straw in Western Canada and Northern Plain 
states.  After the broad biomass and bioenergy literature is reviewed and a discussion of the 
general case of the biomass exchange, the case of Iogen is described.  An example contract, 
retrieved from a biomass producer in Idaho, is examined in detail and compared to current 
biomass exchange methods.  While this paper focuses on the more mirco details of one contract   2
suggested for one biomass exchange, the broader implications for the development of biomass 
industries are revealed. 
Biomass and Bioenegy Literature 
The biomass and bioenergy literature covers many technical and non technical areas.  
Organizational issues are not usually a primary consideration.  Some researchers do 
acknowledge the importance of organization in developing biomass and bioenergy industries.  
Klass (1998) draws attention to failed organizational recommendations in the area of storage and 
shipping of wood biomass.  The storage and shipping methods prescribed in the literature have 
not occurred in industry practice (Klass 1998, p.554).  van Loo and Koppejan (2003) document 
examples where organizational adaptations have solved technological issues— contractual 
arranges in the EU are used to guarantee biomass quality for a nonflexible technology.  Their 
work underscores the importance of understanding organizational issues.  
Other authors, Roos et al. (1999), Costello and Finnell (1998), Lunnan (1997), Rösch and 
Kaltsehmitt (1999), for example, recognize the importance of non-technical barriers, which 
includes potential supply chain and organizational problems.  Roos et al. (1999) develops a broad 
based framework for considering organizational issues.  Critical factors in the choice of 
organization include degree of integration, scale of operation, degree of competition, and 
national and local policy.  Costello and Finnell (1998) identify four potential organizational 
constraints, which they argue can also be opportunities: regulatory environment, financial 
sources, public infrastructure availability and the perceptual beliefs of key actors.  Rösch and 
Kaltsehmitt (1999) identify similar topics adding insurance issues and efficiency of knowledge 
and information flows along the supply chain.  Lunnan (1997) takes an in-depth view of the   3
institutional environment created by bioenergy policy, and especially how bioenergy policy and 
more general agricultural policy can be coordinated.   
More recently Downing et al., (2005) describes agricultural cooperatives as examples of 
research, financing and exchange mechanisms in the agro-bioenergy industry.  Cooperatives are 
a type of biomass exchange mechanism that should be considered.  Cooperative cases can be 
compared to contracting and spot market systems that also exist in the U.S. biopower industry.  
However, in order to carryout such a comparison an adequate description of proposed supply 
chains and procurement strategies must be completed.     
  Overend (1993) provides a description of the main features of a general biomass industry.  
The author concludes: “The industry must rely on short term contracts or the spot market for fuel 
purchases” (Overend 1993, p.2).  However, many biomass industries currently rely on captive 
supplies and integrated systems for fuel procurement.  The underlying questions in determining 
the agro-biomass supply chain strategy are: when are spot markets preferable, and when do more 
integrated procurement systems better serve emerging renewable energy industries like cellulose 
ethanol?  One approach to this area is to examine a technological developer nearing 
commercialization to determine the likely efficiency and effectiveness of their proposed 
procurement strategy.   
The General Case 
From a production cost perspective it seems that cellulose ethanol could be competitive 
with corn ethanol.  As early as the mid 1990’s scientific research on cellulose ethanol 
technologies revealed that cellulose ethanol could be as cheap to produce as corn ethanol (Lynd 
et al., 1996 and Wyman, 1994).  While this research was not based on Iogen’s specific 
technology it does point to the fact that non-technical barriers could be part of the reason that the   4
cellulose ethanol industry has been slow to develop.  If cellulose ethanol is competitive with corn 
ethanol why has no cellulose ethanol been produced commercially, while the expansion of corn 
ethanol is pervasive?  Could supply chain problems and factors like transaction costs hold back 
the industry?  If these non-technical barriers do exist they should be studied in more detail. 
One economic theory that focuses on organization is transaction cost economics.  Beyond 
the basic assumptions such as opportunism, incomplete contracts and bounded rationality (see 
Williamson 1996 for a detailed explanation of transaction cost economics) the crux of TCE is the 
discriminating alignment hypothesis which states that economic actors will: “Align transactions, 
which differ in their attributes, with alternative governance structures, which differ in cost and 
competence, so as to realize a transaction cost economizing result” (Williamson 1996, p.371).  
Three attributes of the transaction are identified: asset specificity, frequency, and 
uncertainty (Williamson, 1979).  In TCE special emphasis is placed on asset specificity.  Asset 
specificity is defined as the value of assets in alternative uses.  In this way, asset specificity helps 
identify opportunity costs of assets used to support an exchange. 
Asset specificity is assigned primary significance in this theory because it creates 
bilateral dependence between otherwise independent actors.  A situation of ex ante independence 
is transformed into ex post bilateral dependence where trading parties are open to the potential of 
opportunism.  In the case of low asset specificity, independent parties are less subject to 
opportunism on the part of their business relations since assets hold relatively high values in 
alternative uses.  TCE holds that the relative efficiency of alternative organizational forms 
depends on asset specificity. 
In potential biomass industries farmers and processors are indeed independent.  However 
once they make specialized investments that support the biomass transaction they typically   5
become bilaterally dependent on each other’s actions.  Hence, the choice of organizational form 
or biomass supply chain strategy becomes central to industry development. 
For bioenergy industries the relevant assets and investments include the processing 
facility, the biomass harvesting equipment, storage and transportation equipment as well as the 
producer’s time and managing effort.  The degree of specificity of these assets will vary 
implying that a range of organizational and supply chain mechanisms will be efficient.   
  Types of asset specificity likely to be important in bioenergy industries include:  
1.  physical asset specificity and spatial asset specificity of the processing facility,  
2.  physical asset specificity of biomass production, transportation and storage 
assets, and  
3.  human asset specificity of producers’ managing effort.   
The choice facing the processor is between entering a new area where spot markets are 
less likely and administrative cost are higher (because longer term contracts are more likely), or 
entering an established biomass area where spot markets can be expected (and transaction costs 
lower)  but the processor will have to compete with other buyers.  The tradeoffs between higher 
biomass prices in the spot market case and higher transaction costs but lower biomass values in 
the contracting case become essential to compare. 
There are several questions that must be answered to predict the most efficient supply 
chain strategy in future industries that will use row crop waste and energy crops. Will the 
processing technology be flexible with respect to biomass quantity and quality?  Will the 
processor be entering an area where farmers already own the necessary equipment to serve the 
industry?  Will special biomass husbandry techniques be expected from biomass producers?     6
Spot markets can be the lowest cost choice in cases where the processing facility is 
flexible with respect to biomass quantity and quality and has low spatial asset specificity, and 
producers already own the physical assets and have the knowledge and experience with 
necessary production techniques (the case of low asset specificity).  However, the processor then 
must be prepared to compete on price with other uses and other buyers.  Absent these low asset 
specificity conditions, spot markets are not likely to be the basis for bioenergy biomass 
exchanges.  Once the processor invests in more specialized technology that binds them to a 
group of producers or if the producers invest in management and physical assets that are targeted 
to serving a particular processor, alternative exchange mechanisms will become more attractive 
than spot markets.  
Alternative exchange mechanisms include the use of long term production and marketing 
contracts as well as various cooperative formations.  Cooperatives can be attractive since there 
could be a single contract between the processor and a supply cooperative instead of with each 
individual producer.  Having one contract between a cooperative and processor can reduce 
administrative costs.  Complex contracts take resources to negotiate and manage.  A multiplicity 
of contracts can increase the cost of enforcement as well.   
The use of custom harvesters and transporters is another complication to consider. 
However, with the use of custom harvesters, there is another relationship/contract to manage. 
The processor must still negotiate and coordinate the access to the land with the 
producer/landowner.  The second relationship to manage is that with the custom harvester to do 
the necessary work.  With more relationships to manage more contingences need to be 
negotiated. What if a producer lays the biomass out to be collected and transported by a custom 
harvester but weather conditions make this impractical.  Who owns and is responsible for the   7
biomass in the field?  This type of problem is avoided with the producer delivery system.  
However, with the producer delivery system the producer/land owner must be willing to invest is 
necessary biomass production equipment.  The custom harvester option should be compared to 
farmer delivery systems to see which is the lower cost system including transaction costs in the 
analysis.   
The Case of Iogen  
  The Iogen Corporation is a Canadian biotech company that has led the world in scientific 
research to produce ethanol from cellulose from such products as straw, corn stover, traditional 
feed crops and dedicated energy crops.  Their genetically modified enzyme process, known as 
enzymatic hydrolysis, produces sugars, glucose and fructose, from the cellulose and 
hemicellulose portions of the biomass.  The sugars can then be fermented with traditional yeast 
strains to produce ethanol.  After studying the technical process for more than 30 years Iogen is 
nearing the full commercialization stage, investigating where to locate the first cellulose-to-
ethanol plant in the world.  The key question addressed in this section is what supply chain 
strategy have they chosen while the next section examines the details of an example contract in 
their proposed producer—processor relationship. 
With any new industry and technology there are various risks and uncertainties.  
Technological uncertainty is always a concern with new technologies and Iogen’s enzymatic 
hydrolysis process is no exception.  How will the process work at full scale is one of many 
technical questions that Iogen has tried to address in their research and development program 
supported financially by Petro Canada, the Canadian Government and Royal Dutch Shell.  In 
2002, Shell’s research division, Shell Globe Solutions, invested $45 million into the 
demonstration of Iogen’s technology (Brown, 2006) which now operates the only demonstration   8
scale processing plant in the world that produces ethanol from cellulose.  More recently 
Goldman Sachs announced an investment of $27 million into commercializing Iogen’s 
technology (McCoy, 2006).   
Beyond the technical uncertainty, which is being addressed through scientific research, 
biomass supply uncertainty is also inherent in this new industry.  Compared to corn ethanol, 
which had well developed supply chains when corn ethanol technology was being 
commercialized, cellulose ethanol faces a much more difficult challenge.  
The scale that Iogen is targeting for the first processing plant would require 
approximately 1500 tons per day of biomass material be made available to the processing facility 
to produce approximately 45 million gallons of ethanol per year (Brown, 2006).  This scale 
would require about 1000 acres per day of land resources.  With this amount of biomass and land 
resources required, an efficient supply chain strategy is essential and is a key organizational 
variable to successful commercialization. 
Financial requirements should also be considered.  The financial resources Iogen projects 
are necessary for the establishment of the first cellulose to ethanol processing plant is in the 
range of $300 - $400 million.  This compares to investments of $30 - $50 million for current 
corn to ethanol plants.  Thus lenders and investors too will want to ensure the feedstock is 
available.    
Adding to the complexity of commercialization is the fact that current exchange 
mechanisms for agricultural crop biomass such as straw and stover include informal search and 
advertising in local media, ad hoc exchanges such as bartering and development of personal 
relationships such as gift giving.  Currently farmers sell there biomass on an ad hoc basis.  Some 
years they could choose not to sell their biomass at all and keep the biomass for soil structure and   9
fertility purposes.  It is likely Iogen and other biomass industry developers will want to have 
more formal relationships with their suppliers. 
It is in this context that Iogen’s supply chain strategy is examined.  They have developed 
the strategy to sign production contracts with farmers in three locations, two in western Canada 
and one in Idaho, with the intention of building one processing facility in one of these locations, 
depending on the financial support and incentives they get from various levels of government 
(Pratt, 2005).  Iogen has attempted to attract guaranteed loans from various levels of government 
to insure the financial success of their venture. 
The main supply mechanism that Iogen has chosen to utilize is standard production 
contracts signed with individual farmers.  One feature of this relationship is that Iogen has a 5-6 
year option to buy the producer’s straw.  Depending on where the plant is ultimately located, 
Iogen will exercise their option on contracts they have signed in the area of the plant and let the 
other contracts expire (Pratt, 2005).  
Farmers have the choice between three pricing options.  They have the choice between a 
fixed price option of $8/ton, a variable price option that ties the price of straw received to the 
price of oil and a mixture of fix and variable price option.  In the second pricing option the price 
of straw would vary from $5-$15 a ton, laid in the field, depending on the price of oil that year 
(Grant, 2006).  This allows the farmer to manage input cost risk of their fossil fuel based inputs 
such as fertilizer and diesel.  
Iogen has also chosen to rely on custom harvest and delivery through separate contracts 
(Pratt, 2005).  That is, storage is clearly defined within the production contract while harvest and 
delivery are more vaguely defined.  Rather than negotiate a delivered price and let the producer 
organize harvest and delivery, Iogen has determined that a custom harvest and delivery system   10
would be cheaper.  They have yet to organize this relationship but will have to coordinate, in 
some fashion, access to the land, for the custom harvester to bale and collect the straw, storage of 
the bales until the plant is ready for delivery and long distance transport from the field edge or 
farm to the processing plant.  These are additional transaction costs that Iogen should take into 
consideration. 
Of course there are many variations to this system that could also be discussed, such as, a 
producer harvest/bail and custom delivery option.  The splitting of activities between producers 
and custom workers reveals many alternatives.  At this point Iogen has chosen the custom 
harvest and delivery option over all others. 
The strategy of custom harvest and delivery is combined with the entry into areas where, 
in general, producers do not typically collect straw for livestock industries.  Thus Iogen is 
expecting the savings from the lower value of biomass to be higher than the transaction costs of 
managing and enforcing contracts which would not be necessary if they entered more established 
biomass area and could utilize spot markets.  The pit fall of having two separate contracting 
systems, one for the biomass, and another for harvest and transportation is the potential 
administrative costs of the system.  The benefit of their strategy is entry into areas where the 
existing price and presumably other alternative uses of the straw is low. 
Although contracts have been signed with producers in the three proposed areas other 
supply mechanisms can still evolve.  Another possibility includes the use of a biomass marketing 
cooperative to lower contracting costs.  Further, producers could integrate into the ethanol 
processing stage as either a processing cooperative or regular corporation and Iogen could 
license their technology and supply enzymes to the processing company.  Finally, even spot   11
markets and futures markets for biomass could evolve if cellulose ethanol becomes more 
prevalent.  
Contractual Analysis 
  The agreement analyzed in this section is an example agreement or draft of a contract 
offered to farmers by the Iogen Corporation (referred to as XXLLC in the contract).  The 
contract was retrieved from the farmer on August 19
th, 2006 (Grant, 2006). 
  The agreement is approximately 4 pages, single spaced, including 7 basic terms of the 
contract: Consideration, Supply Relationship, Resolving: Disputes, Assignment, Termination and 
Extension, Transfer of Agreement and Related Party Obligation, Acts of God and Other 
Interruptions and Notices, Survival, Law, and Prior Representations.  The Supply Relationship 
term is the most complex and includes 9 sub-terms: Producer Straw Commitment, Scope of 
Supply, Term, and Price, Acceptable Straw, Planning and Logistical Requirements, Exercise of 
Option, Responsibility for Coordination, Payment Terms, Price Adjustments for Changes, 
Responsibilities in the Event of Problems.  The following section breaks down each term and 
summarizes the main components of the contract. 
  The first term, Consideration, states the purpose and intent of XXLLC to seek an 
adequate supply of straw for their proposed biorefinery.  Further it states that the producers agree 
that the development efforts of Iogen are sufficient consideration for the producer’s long term 
obligation under the terms of this agreement.  Basically this term defines the basic intentions and 
obligations of the parties. 
  The second term, the Supply Relation term, makes up the bulk of the contract including 9 
sub-terms and various tertiary terms.  The Supply Relationship term breaks down the various 
methods to allocate the straw as well as the rights and responsibilities of the parties which   12
represents the allocation of risk and uncertainty within this relationship.  The first sub- term, 2a) 
Producer Straw Commitment, defines the minimum annual tons the producers will have for sale 
to the processor and defines that the processor has the option to purchase the straw through out 
the life of this contract (5-10years). 
  Sub-term 2b), Scope of Supply, Term, and Price defines how the straw will be valued for 
the purpose of this agreement and the length of the agreement.  First, scope of the supply 
relationship includes that the producer participate in the processor’s planning process, supply 
straw in a windrow, coordinate straw collection, stacking and storage. This must be completed 
with pre-approved custom operators.  Further the farmer must supply storage for up to 12 months 
after harvest and meet standards for straw quality, storage and access (for delivery).  Thus the 
goods and services farmers are compensated for include the good (straw), and services including 
participation in the planning process, coordination of logistics and storage.  More specific 
services are listed in sub-term 2d).   
  In exchange for this good and these services the farmers have a choice between 3 pricing 
and length of contract alternatives for compensation. Choice A involves a fixed price for 5 years 
with the processor having the option to purchase the straw at $8/ton starting at the time the 
ethanol facility starts production.   
  Choice B is the variable price option for the processor to have 10 years right to purchase 
the straw.  In Choice B the price of the straw is tied to the price of oil as determined by the 
previous 12 month average of the price of oil calculated on the 3
rd Friday of April the harvest 
year.  Prices range between $5/ton when oil is below 20/bbl, $8/ton when the price of oil is 
between $30-$35/ bbl and $15/ton when the price of oil is over $65/bbl.  It must be noted that 
this example contract was written the Spring of 2005 when the price of oil was lower than 2006.    13
  Alternative C is a hybrid pricing strategy where half the straw is price at $8/ton up to year 
5 and then $9/ton for years 6-10.  The other 50% of the straw is priced using the Choice B 
framework.  In all three choices the producer grants the option to the processor to purchase the 
straw that must be exercised by April 15
th of the harvest year for part of the Base Commitment 
and prior to July 15
th for the full commitment, according to sub-term 2e) Exercise of Option. 
  Sub-term 2c), Acceptable Straw, defines acceptable straw quality to be harvested, golden 
without rot or weathering, maximum of 18% moisture content, segregated as the type of straw as 
agreed, and free of any preventable toxins as identified by the processor in advance of harvest.  
This term defines a broad and vague right for the processor to define quality ex post.  The 
“preventable toxins” term could be defined more clearly within this clause of the contract. 
  Sub-term 2d), Planning and Logistical Requirements, formally states that the producer 
acknowledges that the processor faces logistical challenges and agrees to take part in the 
planning and procurement process.  Specific items listed for producer activities include: estimate 
crop acres by March 15
th, provide access to the Producer’s Farm Service Agency (FSA) reports, 
provide a forecast of straw production by June 15, provide access to property and information as 
required by the processor, provide notice of all changes to acres farmed, crop rotation, or any 
other pertinent information for straw volume or yields, provide notice of address change, and a 
catch all item stating that the farmer must meet any requirement the processor states will reduce 
risk, streamline operations or administering any matter under this Agreement.  This list includes 
inclusive specific services and general opened services that can be defined later by the processor. 
  Sub-term 2e), Exercise of Option, formally states the dates of April 15 and July 15
th that 
the processor must meet to exercise their option to purchase the farmer’s straw.    14
  Sub-term 2f), Responsibility for Coordination, states that the producer is responsible for 
selecting and working with custom operators to collect the straw under the requirements listed in 
the Agreement.  Further straw storage requirements are explicitly listed and include: that straw 
stacks must be accessible to loading and transport equipment 12 months a year, including winter 
months, 24 hours per day, 7 days per week; this implies snow clearing is the producers 
responsibility.  Straw stacks must also be located in a well-drained location and acceptable 
distances from power lines. 
  Sub-term 2g), Payment Terms, specifies the processors responsibility of how the farmers 
are to be compensated.  There are 3 payments.  First one third of the order value will be paid 
within 30 days of the processor’s receipt of the producer’s FSA commodity report.  The second 
payment will occur after storage at an appropriate site and a processor inspector has verified the 
estimated tonnage.  The final payment will be made on delivery and certified measurement of the 
tons delivered.  Stipulations are also made for over payment and multiple claims on payment. 
  Sub-term 2h), Price Adjustments for Changes, states that the processor has the right to 
develop and modify standards as it requires so long as changes apply to all producers.  Further, 
producers can be compensated for this change in standards. 
  The final sub-term for Term 2, Responsibilities in the Event of Problems, states that in 
the event of non-delivery the rights and responsibilities of the agreement are in effect.  The risk 
of loss remains with the Producer until delivery.  Further, the failure of the processor to enforce 
strict compliance with strict performance does not imply a waiver of performance for other 
producers.  Thus under this agreement farmers own and are responsible for the straw until 
delivery.    15
  Term 3, Resolving disputes, identifies the American Arbitration Associate rules as an 
external contract resolution method. 
  Term 4, Assignment, Termination and Extension, identifies the transferability of the 
rights and responsibilities under this agreement.  The processor has the right to transfer the 
claims for the straw and straw procurement services to another processor.  The producer has the 
right to terminate the agreement if the commencement of construction of a facility has not 
occurred within 4 years of the date of this option.  The processor has the right to offer to extent 
the agreement 2-4 years.  If the producer does not reject the extension within 60 days the 
extension will be deemed accepted. 
  Term 5, Transfer of Agreement and Related Party Obligations, states that in the event the 
producer sells his land or does not renew leased land, the producer shall make their best effort to 
transfer the obligations under this agreement.  Further this term states that neither the producer 
nor successor operators can sell straw to competition firms without meeting the obligation of this 
agreement first. 
  Term 6, Acts of God and Other Interruptions, performance may be excused because of 
acts of God, to the extent that is prevented or delayed performance.  Acts of God listed include 
weather, war, civil insurrection, fire flood, strike, failure of transportation, interruption of power, 
government laws, regulations, or orders, or other causes.  This term protects the farmers in some 
cases beyond their control. 
  Term, 7, Notices, Survival, Law, and Prior Representations, states that the agreement is 
binding to the heirs of the party, will be construed by state law, and supersedes any prior 
agreements.  A final section of the contract includes data and signatures of the producer and field 
representative of the processor.   16
  The important elements of the contract include that the pricing elements give producers 
the ability to reduce input cost risk and that several terms offer Iogen control rights ex post while 
leaving responsibilities of the producer vaguely defined.  The production contract in general is 
specific on some rights and responsibilities while vague on others, thus, contract imperfections 
and enforcement costs are inevitable.   
  However, this formal contracting effort represents the desire to improve on current 
biomass exchange mechanisms and to lower yearly search costs.  In current hay and straw 
markets, the biomass is sold on a much more informal basis.  Informal search methods can 
include local ranchers or other purchasers “checking crops”.  Local advertising can be used to 
communicate biomass for sale.  Further ad hoc relationships have evolved where local suppliers 
and demanders use barter systems, exchanging other services such as the use of machinery for 
biomass.  Instead of having informal relationships with many farmers from year to year, Iogen 
has decided to pursue the long term standard production contacts defined above.  Although it will 
take and has taken resources to design, offer and enforce these contracts, Iogen estimates this 
system will be cheaper than current biomass exchange methods.  
  This behavior could stem from Iogen’s level of asset specificity.  After more than 30 
years of scientific investigation into their processing technology, and targeting their enzymes to 
process wheat straw in a relatively dry climate, they do not intend to rely on current informal, 
short term exchange mechanisms that are common in current straw and hay markets.  Rather they 
have perused long term (5-10) year contracts on a much more formal basis that could require 
high negotiation, administrative and enforcement costs but matches their level of asset 
specificity.  If they had a lower level of asset specificity they would be more likely to prefer spot 
markets and current ad hoc methods of exchange.      17
Conclusion 
  This paper examines, from an organizational perspective, the general biomass case and 
the specific case of the Iogen Corporation as an example of new bioenergy industries with a 
focus on the type of exchange mechanism.  An example contract is examined and is 
demonstrated to have various vaguely define rights and responsibilities.  Yet this method of 
exchange is preferred to existing informal exchange mechanisms in current biomass markets. 
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